PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi’s cabinet takes oath

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi’s 43-member cabinet was sworn-in by President Mamnoon Hussain at a ceremony on Friday morning.

The new cabinet includes eight members from South Punjab, five each from Balochistan and Sindh, three from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one each from FATA and Islamabad.

Sources said party MNAs Daniyal Aziz, Mir Dostain Domki, Ayaz Sherazi and Mumtaz Tarar did not attend the ceremony despite being on the list of new ministers.

Aziz is said to have reservations regarding his appointment as a state minister, according to sources. But Aziz rubbished such claims in a tweet, saying he stands with Nawaz Sharif.

A new ministry of ‘power’ has also been formed after combining the ministries of petroleum and electricity, sources added. A separate ministry of water will be formed as well. The prime minister, who held the portfolio of petroleum and natural resources ministry in the previous cabinet, will head the new power ministry.

The oath-taking ceremony took place at the Presidency and was attended by PML-N members and senior government officials, as well as people from other walks of life.

The members of the cabinet, speaking after the president, repeated their oath of office submitted the signed oaths to the president.

Following the oath-taking, the prime minister chaired the first session of his cabinet. The premier gave directions to the ministers to complete their designated tasks in the stipulated time period.

In the meeting, it was also decided that the cabinet will meet weekly so the ministries’ weekly progress can be gauged.


Merkel meets with Putin on rare Russia visit

SOCHI, Russia: German Chancellor Angela Merkel held talks yesterday with President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine and Syria in a signal of renewed dialogue despite profound rifts on her first visit to Russia since 2015.  “We cannot but use this visit to discuss bilateral relations and the most problematic points, by which I mean Ukraine and Syria and maybe some other regions,” Putin told Merkel at the start of the meeting in the Black Sea resort city of Sochi.

SOCHI: Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Bocharov Ruchei state residence in Sochi yesterday. —AFP

The Russian and German leaders have scaled back links as Moscow’s ties with the EU plunged to a post-Cold War low over the crisis in Ukraine.  Berlin has said yesterday’s meeting would “above all” focus on the upcoming G20 summit in Hamburg in July and no breakthroughs were expected on major disagreements, although Putin earlier called for ties “to fully normalize.”

Merkel has strongly backed EU sanctions on Russia for seizing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and supporting the pro-Kremlin separatist insurgency in the east of the country. Moscow has responded with an embargo on agricultural products from the West. A European-brokered peace plan to end the conflict has hit a dead end.
The German leader last visited Russia in May 2015 when she met Putin in Moscow but, like most Western leaders, snubbed a Red Square parade for the 70th anniversary of World War II victory.

‘Difficult context’
Merkel has been the main mediator with Putin over the crisis in Ukraine. She is a key proponent of keeping sanctions on Moscow in place until a stalled peace plan to end the conflict in Europe’s backyard is fulfilled. Merkel and Putin have taken part in a number of four-way meetings, most recently last October, with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and France’s Francois Hollande aimed at implementing the plan the four countries hammered out in February 2015.

Last month, Merkel and Putin participated in a four-way phone conversation with Poroshenko and Hollande, agreeing to step up the peace deal’s implementation. “There are two topics that weigh down relations… the annexation of Crimea contrary to international law and then the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists,” Merkel spokesman Steffen Seibert told journalists ahead of the visit.

Kiev and the West accuse Moscow of providing military support to the rebels in eastern Ukraine, a charge it denies. Both sides have also said the talks will cover the conflict in Syria, where Putin’s military backing for leader Bashar al-Assad has set him at odds with the West.
In her first official visit to Russia last week, EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini insisted that cooperation between the two sides was “not frozen” but said progress was hampered by profound disagreements on subjects including Ukraine and Syria.

‘Diplomatic ice age thawing’
The G20 is now the only format for Russia to meet the other major international powers after its exclusion from the G8, now the G7. At the G20 summit, Putin is expected to meet US President Donald Trump. Immediately after meeting Merkel the Kremlin strongman is set to hold his third phone call with Trump.

Merkel visited Saudi Arabia on Sunday for talks focusing on preparations for the G20. German broadcaster Deutsche Welle suggested ahead of Merkel’s visit that “the diplomatic ice age… might be nearing an end” as it sends “a strong diplomatic signal” of both sides’ willingness to engage.

The leaders are set to hold a press conference at 1230 GMT between two rounds of talks, Seibert said. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is also due to meet Putin in Sochi today. The two leaders have inched closer together on Syria as Erdogan’s ties with Europe have plummeted.  – AFP


Pakistan-Afghanistan crossing closed after border clash

Pakistan-Afghanistan crossing closed after border clash
Afghan and Pakistani forces accuse each other in deadly cross-border battle during Baluchistan population census.

pakistan afghan border
Pakistan and Afghanistan share a roughly 2,500km-long border, which remains largely unpoliced [Matiullah Achakzai/Reuters]
At least 15 people have been killed and dozens others wounded after a cross-border battle between Pakistani and Afghan forces during a Pakistani population census near the border, officials from both countries said.

The attack on Friday left dozens of people wounded and happened near the Chaman crossing point in Balochistan province prompting security forces to ask people to evacuate villages on the border.

Nine Pakistanis and six Afghans were killed in the clashes, which lasted for several hours.

Chaman, one of the two main border crossings between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was closed in the wake of the incident, with firing ongoing, Pakistani military spokesman Asif Ghafoor said in a statement.

“Since April 30, Afghan Border Police had been creating hurdles in conduct of census in divided villages of Killi Luqman and Killi Jahangir in Chaman area, on Pakistani side of the border,” the statement said.

Afghanistan’s foreign ministry said it had warned Pakistan against conducting the census in the villages in the border area, which remains disputed between the two countries.

“This area of dispute the imaginary Durand line is not clear and according to the government of Afghanistan the villages (where the clashes happened) are located on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan claims that these villages are on their side of the Durand line,” Ahmad Shekib Mostaghni, spokesman for the Afghan foreign ministry, told Al Jazeera.

“They were warned that they should not conduct the census in the disputed areas and they (Pakistan) have also promised us that they would not conduct the census there,” Mostaghni said.

“The violation was committed by Pakistan as the Pakistan armed forces entered the villages of Loqman and Haji Nazar which are located on the Afghan side of the Durand line and areas are elated to the Spin Boldak of Kandahar province. Their defence is the duty of the Afghan national defence forces,” he added.

Pakistan census
Pakistan is currently conducting the second phase of its first door-to-door population census in 19 years, with more than 100,000 enumerators and 200,000 troops taking part in the exercise.

The lead-up to the census has been marked by political debate on how the results may show changing demographics – potentially redrawing electoral constituencies – across the country.

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a roughly 2,500km-long border, which runs through mountainous terrain and remains largely unpoliced.

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a roughly 2,500km-long border, which runs through mountainous terrain and remains largely unpoliced.

Recent Pakistani attempts to establish fences and border posts along the border to curtail the movement of Taliban fighters into Pakistan have been met with resistance from Afghanistan, which disputes the border.

In February, Pakistan sealed all border crossings with Afghanistan for over a month after a wave of attacks across Pakistan killed more than 100 people.

Those attacks were followed by frequent skirmishes between Pakistani Taliban fighters and Pakistan’s military along the border in the Mohmand, Khyber and other districts.

On March 20, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the reopening of the border crossings.

Since the census was launched in March, government census teams have also come under attack from Taliban fighters.

On April 5, a census team was hit by an explosion in the eastern city of Lahore, killing at least six people.

Two government census workers were also killed when a blast hit a passing passenger van in the northwestern Kurram district on April 25.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban claimed responsibility for both attacks.

News Source:


Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Being a neighbor, Pakistan gives paramount importance to its relations with Afghanistan as Pakistan’s peace and stability depends on Afghan peace and stability. Traditionally, Pak-Afghan relationship has been characterized by mutual mistrust and lack of confidence and third parties have always been a decisive factor in determining the Pak-Afghan relations.

Starting from the history since Pakistan got the independence from British Rule in 1947, we have seen rise and fall in the relations between Af-Pak relations so now lets go through the history below :


Durand Line

According to an Article-Gartenstein_Ross-and-Vassefi the Afghanistan’s eastern border was settled in 1893. At the time, Britain had considerable strategic interests in the region because of its perceived need to protect the jewel in its colonial crown, British India. The amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, opposed Britain’s proposal for the Afghan-Indian border, which would force him to relinquish “his nominal sovereignty over the Pashtun tribes in the region” outside the border favored by the British. The strength of Abdur Rahman’s objection to splitting up the Pashtuns in this manner should not be understated. Historically, the idea of being “Afghan” was tied to being from the Pashtun ethnic group. As James Spain, a former cultural affairs officer at the American embassy in Karachi, has written, the Durand Line that demarcated the border between Afghanistan and British India left “half of a people intimately related by culture, history, and blood on either side.” Yet Abdur Rahman was forced to agree to this border by the threat of economic embargo. He relied on British subsidies to maintain his central government’s dominance, and was in particular need of it when the border was set because he was then engaged in warfare against the

Hazaras Afghanistan has never accepted the legitimacy of the Durand Line (although they should have after the creation of Pakistan), named after its architect, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. However, the country had little recourse when faced with a global superpower like Britain. This changed with the creation of Pakistan. Afghanistan had long been recognized as an independent state by the time Pakistan was created in 1947 but geopolitical scenario shows Pakistan emerged as more powerful than Afghanistan as visionary state, but some people at that time thought  there was no particular reason to think that Pakistan was built to last. Pakistan’s lack of cohesion is signaled even by its name, as it is an acronym for the areas encompassed within the state: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. Additionally, Pakistan was born of a bloody partition with India—something that produced not only the two states, but also an arch-rivalry that persists to this day.

Just as many Indian leaders thought the new state of Pakistan might not survive, so too did Afghan politicians. Immediately after Pakistan emerged, Afghanistan put forward a demand for the creation of an independent “Pashtunistan,” meaning “land of the Pashtuns.” The idea was that Pakistan should allow the Pashtuns in the northwestern part of their country to—if they so chose—secede and become an independent state. Though the size of the envisioned Pashtunistan differed over time, Afghanistan’s proposals frequently encompassed about half of West Pakistan, including areas dominated by Baluch majorities. Though these demands were framed as supportive of Pashtun national independence, they were in fact irredentist. If Pashtunistan came to exist, it probably wouldn’t remain independent for long, as it would be a fragile and essentially defenseless state. The historical linkage between the Pashtuns and Afghanistan would likely dictate a merger of Pashtunistan into Afghanistan. And even if Pakistan never acceded to the Pashtunistan demand, Afghanistan had essentially staked its claim to that area if the Pakistani state were to fail. The incorporation of Pashtunistan and the majority Baluch areas into Afghanistan would, in turn, solve one of Afghanistan’s major strategic weaknesses—the fact that it’s a landlocked state. The Baluch majority areas would give Afghanistan access to the Arabian Sea. From a legal perspective, Afghanistan’s claim about the illegitimacy of its border with Pakistan was rather weak. Though Afghanistan claimed that the border had been drawn under duress, it had in fact confirmed the demarcation of this international frontier on multiple occasions, including in agreements concluded in 1905, 1919, 1921, and 1930.10 But the weakness of Afghanistan’s legal case took a backseat to the historical connection it felt to the Pashtun areas, and the strategic benefits it would derive from expanding its territory.

This brings us to the episodes in the history between Afghanistan and Pakistan that have so often been missing from contemporary discourse: not only do the two countries have a disputed border, but Afghanistan has rather aggressively pursued actions designed to expand its territory at Pakistan’s expense.

Afghanistan’s early incursions

Afghanistan’s Early Incursions into Pakistan Less than a decade after the birth of the new state of Pakistan, James Spain noted, “relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have come to be centered on one issue.”11 That single issue was Pashtunistan. It was Afghanistan rather than Pakistan that chose to make this border dispute, and the issue of Pashtunistan, so central to the two states’ relations. At the outset, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission into the United Nations, justifying this vote with the argument that Pakistan’s northwest frontier “should not be recognized as a part of Pakistan until the Pashtuns of that area had been given the opportunity to opt out for independence.”12 Pakistan was admitted despite Afghanistan’s objections. But thereafter Kabul launched a series of low-level attacks against Pakistan, maintaining some degree of plausible deniability throughout (as Pakistan would later do when non-state actors that it sponsored struck at India, Afghanistan, US forces, and others).

George Montagno, who served as a visiting professor of American history at the University of Karachi, has noted that for years after Pakistan’s creation, Afghan agents operated within the Pashtun areas, “distributing large amounts of money, ammunition and even transistor radios in an effort to sway loyalties from Pakistan to Afghanistan.”13 Another of their obvious goals was to build support for an independent Pashtunistan. At the same time that Afghanistan worked to build support within Pakistan’s Pashtun areas, it also escalated its attacks into Pakistan proper. Pakistan claimed that on September 30, 1950, its northern border was attacked by Afghan tribesmen, as well as regular Afghan troops, who crossed into Pakistan 30 miles northeast of Chaman in Baluchistan.

It didn’t take long for Pakistan to repel this low-scale invasion, and the government of Pakistan announced that it had “driven invaders from Afghanistan back across the border after six days of fighting.” For its own part, Afghanistan claimed that it had no involvement in this attack(which we know there was huge support from afghanistan), which it said was comprised exclusively of Pashtun tribesmen agitating for an independent Pashtunistan. But given Afghanistan’s later use of irregular forces dressed as tribesmen, Pakistan’s claims that the aggression had emanated from Afghanistan’s government seem credible. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan rose markedly in 1955, when Pakistan announced that it was consolidating its control over its tribal areas.

In response, Afghan prime minister Mohammed Daoud Khan criticized Pakistan’s actions over the airwaves of Radio Kabul on March 29, 1955. Demonstrations that were reportedly inspired by the Afghan government flared up in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. S.M.M. Qureshi of the University of Alberta noted that “Pakistan flags were pulled down and insulted and the [Pashtunistan] flag was hoisted on the chancery of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul.”16 This incident caused the two countries to withdraw their ambassadors, and relations weren’t fully restored until 1957. The next crisis in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations came in 1960- 61. Khurshid Hasan, at the time a member of the department of international relations at the University of Karachi, recounts, “In 1960, fresh border clashes took place. Afghan irregulars and Army troops dressed as tribesmen were reported to have penetrated the Pakistan side of the Durand Line with the sanction of the Afghan Government. Two other raids took place in May and fall of 1961.”17 News reports from that period corroborate Hasan’s account.

In late September 1960, an Afghan lashkar (irregular forces) crossed into Pakistan’s Bajaur area. Pakistan’s government announced that the lashkar “clashed with loyal tribesmen and fled after suffering heavy casualties.”18 But Pakistan alleged that conventional Afghan military resources, including tanks, had also massed on the Afghan side of the border near Bajaur. What Afghanistan’s official news agency described as “a major battle” eventually broke out between the two sides.

Pakistan bombarded Afghan forces using its airpower; rather than escalating the conflict, this quelled hostilities, at least for the time being. The May 1961 clashes occurred in the area of the Khyber Pass. Pakistani president Muhammad Ayub Khan announced that regular Afghan forces had attacked Pakistani posts at the border. The Pakistani air force strafed Afghan positions in response.21 On May 22, Pakistani warplanes struck again, attempting to wipe out a base of raiding Afghan troops in Baganandail. With this aerial strafing, alongside police patrols, roadblocks, and even bombs going off, the New York Times noted in late May that “relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan appear to have reached a new low, and no relief is in sight.”23 Indeed, after the next skirmishes broke out in the fall of 1961, Afghanistan and Pakistan formally severed diplomatic relations.24 These broken relations had acute economic consequences for both countries, particularly for landlocked Afghanistan. The shah of Iran helped to mediate a détente between the two neighbors in 1963.

The resulting peace lasted about a decade, until Mohammed Daoud Khan (who served as Afghanistan’s prime minister during the 1955 crisis between the countries) deposed his cousin, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, on July 17, 1973. Daoud’s Legacy: A Rivalry Reignited Daoud was an ardent supporter of the Pashtunistan concept, and his passion for the matter produced the collapse of détente. He referred to the border dispute almost immediately upon assuming power, and the independent state for which he agitated included not only Pakistan’s majority Pashtun areas but also its majority Baluch areas.

Daoud’s regime provided sanctuary, arms, and ammunition to Pashtun and Baluch nationalist groups. Pakistan saw this as a significant challenge because its Baluch regions had been in “virtual revolt,” requiring the intervention of Pakistan’s military even before Daoud began to support Baluch separatism.25 Even as Daoud fomented ethnic insurgency inside Pakistan, his regime simultaneously condemned Pakistan before the United Nations for being “genocidal” in its treatment of ethnic minorities. This escalation came at a time when Pakistan had already lost nearly a third of its territory, as East Pakistan seceded in 1971 and became Bangladesh. Rizwan Hussain, a research scholar at The Australian National University, writes that Afghanistan’s actions “posed the greatest threat to Pakistan’s integrity since the secession of East Pakistan.”26

Obviously, this called for a response. Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—a secular reformist whose rule included several questionable decisions that unwittingly empowered Islamist factions 27—fashioned a two-part responsive strategy. One part was to suppress nationalist uprisings in Pakistan’s Frontier. A second part was a “forward policy” that supported violent Islamist factions inside Afghanistan. This was symmetrical with the manner in which Afghanistan had supported violent nationalist groups inside Pakistan. A.Z. Hilali, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Peshawar, notes that Bhutto’s government “found many Afghan Islamists who were useful as a counterweight to the pro-Indian and relatively pro-Soviet policies of Daoud’s government.”28 Afghan Islamists who received covert aid from Pakistan during this time included Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both of whom were destined to become important figures during the Afghan-Soviet war and beyond.29 (After the communist-leaning regime of Mohammad Najibullah collapsed in 1992, Hikmatyar became Afghanistan’s “prime minister,” and shelled the capital city held by “president” Rabbani on a daily basis.) There were strategic reasons behind Pakistan’s support for these Islamist factions. For one, Pakistan believed that groups whose primary identification was religious might be less likely to support ethno-nationalist demands of the kind that drove

Afghan policy toward Pakistan’s Pashtuns and Balochs. It also seems that Pakistan believed Islamist groups in Afghanistan were more likely to be hostile toward India. This calculation proved to be correct: The only time since Pakistan’s creation that Afghanistan has had warm relations with Pakistan while simultaneously being hostile to India was during the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s. Thus, Pakistan’s initial support for violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan was spurred directly by the Afghan government’s sponsorship of separatist groups in Pakistan under the Daoud regime, as well as aggressive Afghan actions that had preceded Daoud. Pakistan’s support for such groups would of course grow during the 1980s, which saw the Afghan-Soviet war grip the region, and also during the 1990s, when Pakistan supported the Taliban during Afghanistan’s civil war. Conclusion: Af-Pak History and Contemporary US Policy Overall, the factors driving Pakistan’s support for violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan represent a tangled web. There are, of course, strategic calculations behind Pakistan’s support for these groups—strategic calculations that began with Afghanistan’s escalating aggression against Pakistan, but also came to encompass the need for “strategic depth” in Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Personal relationships would develop between Pakistani officers and the non-state actors they supported.

There were also changes to Pakistan’s military culture, which—though the precise degree to which this occurred has been debated by scholars—clearly underwent some degree of “Islamization.” This process began under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,30 but escalated markedly under Gen. Muhammad Zia ul Haq, who deposed Bhutto in a July 1977 military coup. Zia brought a number of changes to the Pakistani military after his coup. These included incorporating Islamic teachings (such as S.K. Malik’s The Qur’anic Concept of War) into military training, incorporating religious criteria into officers’ promotion requirements and exams, and requiring formal obedience to Islamic rules within the military. At the same time Zia implemented these policies, the demographics of the officer corps were shifting. The first generation of officers from the country’s generally secular social elites was replaced by new junior officers from Pakistan’s poorer northern districts. Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain notes that “the spirit of liberalism, common in the ‘old’ army, was practically unknown to them. They were products of a social class that, by its very nature, was conservative and easily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism.”31 So the potent mix of motivations impelling Pakistan’s support for Islamist groups in Afghanistan included strategic calculations, personal relationships, and changes to the organizational culture of Pakistan’s military. This mix of motivations was underestimated by American planners in the early stages of the US war in Afghanistan. Following US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage’s now-infamous post-9/11 threat to bomb Pakistan “back to the Stone Age” if it didn’t reorient itself away from the Taliban,32 Musharraf executed the about-face to which we referred at the beginning of this article, announcing that Pakistani groups would not be allowed to engage in terrorism. We noted that the announced changes did not hold up. The reason lies in the fact that, as Zahid Hussain has written, “Musharraf’s decision to forge a partnership with America meant taking Pakistan to war with itself.” 33 Indeed, one of the biggest problems lies in the fact that American planners didn’t realize the utter likelihood of this failure. The mistaken belief that Pakistan’s turn away from supporting stateless Islamist militants in 2001–02 might be permanent helped to seriously retard the US’s development of a coherent policy dealing with the many problems emanating from Pakistan. But the legacy of this forgotten period in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations—the period of Afghan aggression against Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue—continues to be relevant today. Put simply, some issues will resonate more deeply with Pakistan than Americans believe. Bellicose Afghan statements following major attacks in their country may be justified, but these statements may also strike a chord that reminds Pakistanis of days when they were neither the stronger of the two neighbors, nor the more aggressive one.

Further, when the United States pursues cross-border tribal unity to try to stabilize Afghanistan—as it has done, for example, in Nangarhar province—it may trigger concerns on the Pakistani side about a possible Pashtun uprising. This forgotten history, and the tangled web of motivations that it helped produce, makes clear how truly difficult a simple-sounding proposition like “change Pakistan’s strategic orientation” can be. None of this is meant to forgive the pernicious role that Pakistan currently plays within Afghanistan. But one clear problem of the past decade has been a failure to appreciate Pakistani strategic calculations. Fully comprehending the period in the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan outlined in this article may be an important part of forging more appropriate policies moving forward.


Y – Charles Faint served as Lead Editor for this article.


1 Richard Weitz, “How Pakistan Kids Itself on China,” The Diplomat, Dec. 28, 2011.

2 Elisabeth Bumiller & Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” New York Times, Sept. 22, 2011.

3 Paul Tighe & Haris Anwar, “Obama Says Pakistan Has ‘Unsavory’ Contacts to Hedge Bets in Afghanistan,” Bloomberg, Oct. 6, 2011.

4 Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, “CIA Outlines Pakistan Links with Militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008.

5 See Nick Schifrin, “WikiLeaks Data Seem to Show Pakistan Helped Attack American Troops,” ABC News, July 26, 2010 (elaborating on internal US assessments, as revealed by WikiLeaks documents); Matt Waldman, The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents, London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Centre, Discussion Paper 18, June 2010.

6 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 51.

7 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 154.

8 James W. Spain, “Pakistan’s North West Frontier,” Middle East Journal 8(1), 1954, p. 30.

9 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p.10.

10 Khurshid Hasan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” Asian Survey 2(7), 1962, p. 15. 11 Spain, “Pakistan’s North West Frontier,” p. 35.

12 Hasan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” p. 16.

13 George L. Montagno, “The Pak-Afghan Détente,” Asian Survey 3(12), 1963, p. 620.

14 “Pakistan Says Afghans Launch War,” Associated Press, Oct. 4, 1950.

15 “Invaders Out, Pakistan Says,” Associated Press, Oct. 5, 1950.

16 S.M.M. Qureshi, “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs 39(1/2), 1966, p. 105.

17 Hasan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” p. 16.

18 “Pakistan Fears Afghan Invasion,” Reuters, Sept. 23, 1960.

19 “Incursion by Afghans ‘Beaten Back,’ Says Pakistan,” Guardian (London), Sept. 29, 1960.

20 “Afghans Report Pakistani Clash,” Reuters, Oct. 8, 1960.

21 “Regular Afghan Army Battles Pakistanis in Khyber Pass Area,” Associated Press, May 21, 1961.

22 “Pakistan Planes Again Strafe Afghan Base,” Associated Press, May 23, 1961.

23 Paul Grimes, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Tense as Dispute on Tribe Worsens,” New York Times, May 29, 1961.

24 “Afghanistan Breaks with Pakistan,” Reuters, Sept. 6, 1961.

25 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p. 78.

26 Ibid. 27 One example is Bhutto’s policy toward Pakistan’s Ahmadis. See Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 81-82.

28 A.Z. Hilali, U.S.-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p. 104.

29 Hafizullah Emadi, “Durand Line and Afghan-Pak Relations,” Economic and Political Weekly, July 14, 1990.

30 Stephen P. Cohen, interview with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nov. 24, 2008.

31 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 20.

32 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 201.

33 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. viii.



White Mosque Russia

The White Mosque was officially opened on 10 June 2012 with participation of a wide public within the framework of the Bolgar Forum “Izge Bolgar Jiyeny”.

The ensemble of the White Mosque (Ak Mechet), which was erected by design of architect Sergey Shakurov, includes the buildings of a Muslim temple, a residence of the mufty, and a madrasah, which encircle the prayer square, musallah, with a fountain in its centre and encircled by an arcade of 88 snow-white columns. Owing to the open arcade, visitors do not lose visual contact with nature and archaeological excavations of the ancient Bolgar.

The mosque strikes with its geometric ornaments, carved decoration, elegance of interiors, and its overall stylistics. The area of the prayer hall is 180 sq. m. Two minarets of the mosque, 46.5 metres high, which were made, by proposal of Mintimer Shaimiev, the First President of Tatarstan, in the style of the minarets of the Mosque of the Prophet located in Medina, the famous place of pilgrimage of the Muslims of the world, enframe the main building of the sanctuary that is topped by the cupola with diameter of 10 metres, height of 17 metres in its interior measurement and decorated with traditional decorative elements.

One thousand and two hundred tonnes of marble were used for its construction. The white colour of the mosque stands for peace and purity.

A lake was created on the square, reflected in which is the whole White Mosque.;